In re Pers. Restraint of Williams

Washington Constitution Article I, Section 14 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.”)

In the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic, Robert Rufus Williams filed a personal restraint petition (PRP), arguing that the conditions of his confinement constitute cruel punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutions. At the time, Williams was 77 years old, suffered from diabetes and hypertension, and required use of a wheelchair. While confined in Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities, Williams asked the state supreme court to order his sentence be served in home confinement at his sister’s home in Florida until COVID-19 no longer posed a threat to him.

(1) Washington’s prohibition on “cruel” punishments, found in Article I, Section 14, is broader than the Eighth Amendment regarding conditions of confinement; (2) to succeed on a conditions of confinement claim under Section 14, petitioners need not prove the subjective intent of DOC officials or corrections officers; and (3) Williams’s conditions of confinement were cruel under Section 14 because he lacked reasonable access to bathroom facilities and running water, and the DOC failed to provide Williams with appropriate assistance in light of his physical disabilities. The court ordered DOC to remedy these unconstitutionally cruel conditions or release Williams.

First, the court relied primarily on constitutional text, history, and existing precedent to find that Section 14 must be broader than the Eighth Amendment in this context. The textual distinction of banning “cruel” punishments instead of “cruel and unusual” punishment is significant. As for history, the court found that the framers of Washington’s constitution were concerned with protecting incarcerated people from the cruelty of the convict leasing system, and adopted a specific provision to do so. “The drafters’ decision to enshrine a prohibition on private contract leasing in Washington’s constitution demonstrates this state’s long-standing interest in providing some measure of protection against harsh conditions of confinement,” the court reasoned. The court also found that the state’s general history of prison reform was relevant, and counseled in favor of recognizing broader rights protections.

Finally—and perhaps with major implications for excessive sentencing cases—the court noted existing precedent recognizing that “punishments that were once constitutional ‘can become cruel under article I, section 14 if there is a material change in circumstances.’ Pet’r’s Opening Br. in Supp. of PRP at 23 (Wash. Ct. App. No. 54629‑9‑II (2020)) (citing Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 91 (holding Washington’s cruel punishment clause prohibits life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders); State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018) (plurality opinion) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional as applied in Washington)).” Though the court cites cases in which entire categories of punishments became unconstitutional, it implicitly recognized that changes in an individual person’s circumstances, such as an illness or disability, could render an existing sentence unconstitutionally excessive. The court wrote: “Though Bassett and Gregory concern disproportionate sentencing challenges, those cases recognize the general principle that scientific developments and changes in circumstances can render once-acceptable punishments unconstitutionally cruel. See Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 81 (considering the evolution of juvenile sentencing in Washington); Gregory, 192 Wn.2d at 18-19 (examining statistical data that shows the arbitrary and racially biased administration of the death penalty in Washington). Both cases recognize the effect of immutable characteristics on disproportionate sentencing. In so doing, they illustrate an evolution in understanding of immutable characteristics such as physical and mental disability, and the need for accommodation.”

Next, having recognized that Section 14 is broader, it rejected the federal “deliberate indifference” standard, and instead created a state constitutional standard that lowers the burden for plaintiffs to successfully challenge their conditions of confinement. The federal standard demands proof that a particular prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” to health and safety risks. Plus a subjective component requires that an official actually “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Under Section 14, though, the court dispensed with this “subjective” requirement: “Under article I, section 14, whether a condition of confinement is cruel does not depend on the subjective knowledge or intent of particular prison officials. Instead, the text and history of Washington law recognizes that the State has a nondelegable obligation to provide for the health, safety, and well-being of prisoners under its jurisdiction,” and “[w]hether prison conditions deprive prisoners of basic human dignity intentionally or incidentally, Washington’s constitution prohibits such treatment.” To prevail on a Section 14 challenge to conditions of confinement, a petitioner must demonstrate “that (1) those conditions create an objectively significant risk of serious harm or otherwise deprive them of the basic necessities of human dignity and (2) those conditions are not reasonably necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological goal.”

Williams met that standard here because DOC deprived him of basic hygiene, and that deprivation was not necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological goal.