People v. Lorentzen

MICH. CONST. ART. I, § 16 (“cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted”)

Eric Lorentzen, charged with making an unlawful sale of marijuana, was arrested on November 20, 1969. He was 23 years old, living with his parents, employed at General Motors, and had no prior criminal convictions. Lorentzen was convicted in a trial by jury and was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 to 21 years, under a statute setting a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years for selling or giving away any quantity of marijuana (or other “narcotics”). On appeal, Lorentzen (among other claims) challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment under both the federal 8th Amendment and Michigan Const. Art. I, § 16.

A mandatory sentence of 20 years in prison for selling any quantity of marijuana violates both the “cruel and unusual” clause in the federal 8th Amendment and the “cruel or unusual” clause of Michigan’s Constitution: “A compulsory prison sentence of 20 years for a nonviolent crime imposed without consideration for defendant’s individual personality and history is so excessive that it ‘shocks the conscience.’”

First, the Court identified a proportionality principle in both the U.S. and Michigan constitutions: “It will be seen from the above discussion of the leading United States Supreme Court case and cases decided by this Court that the dominant test of cruel and unusual punishment is that the punishment is in excess of any that would be suitable to fit the crime.”

In applying this principle, the Lorentzen Court (1) noted the severity of the sentence imposed and the fact that it would apply to a marijuana sale by “a first offender high school student.” The Court then (2) compared the penalty to those imposed for numerous other crimes in Michigan, along with (3) Michigan’s penalty for selling marijuana to the penalties imposed for that offense by other states. Finally, the Court applied a (4) fourth criterion rooted in Michigan’s legal traditions, and reflected in the provision for “indeterminate sentences” of Const 1963, art 4, § 45: the goal of rehabilitation.

Ultimately, the Court found Lorentzen’s sentence to be disproportionate under all these factors. But more than anything else, this case cemented the goal of pursuing rehabilitation as a cornerstone of Section 16 excessive punishment analysis, and made clear that courts must consider expert and other evidence about the efficacy of challenged punishments: “Experts on penology and criminal corrections tend to be of the opinion that, except for extremely serious crimes or unusually disturbed persons, the goal of rehabilitating offenders with maximum effectiveness can best be reached by short sentences of less than five years’ imprisonment. … If we apply the goal of rehabilitation, it seems dubious, to say the least, that now 26-year old Eric Lorentzen will be a better member of society after serving a prison sentence of at least 10 years, 7 months, and 6 days.”