People v. Taylor / People v. Czarnecki

MICH. CONST. ART. I, § 16 (“cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted”)

Andrew Czarnecki and Montario Taylor received mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for homicide offenses committed at the ages of 19 and 20, respectively. On appeal, both argued that the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Parks that banned mandatory LWOP for 18-year-olds under the state constitution should extend to anyone under age 21, which would entitle them to resentencing where the mitigating characteristics of youth and considered and prosecutors must rebut a presumption against LWOP.

In a 5-2 decision, the court held that mandatory LWOP sentences for emerging adults (or “late adolescents”) under age 21 are “cruel or unusual” punishment under the Michigan state constitution.

The court reasoned that, for sentencing purposes, emerging adults under age 21 are similarly situated to youth and 18-year-olds, and therefore the protections recognized in Parks must apply. The court’s analysis first explained that “as a class, 19- and 20-year-old late adolescents are more similar to juveniles in neurological terms than they are to older adults.” This means that they inherently have reduced cuplability–as they are more likely to act impulsively and succumb to peer pressure–and a greater capacity to change. The court then chronicled the various ways in which the state does not recognize full adulthood until at least age 21. For example, someone cannot serve in the state legislature, consume or purchase alcohol, obtain a concealed pistol license, or gamble until 21. Federal law provides other examples.

With this background, the court then applied its longstanding multi-factor test to assess whether a challenged punishment is “grossly disproportionate.” Importantly, the court has repeatedly held that this test must be informed by “the evolving standards of decency,” but has distilled that principle into four factors: “(1) the severity of the punishment relative to the gravity of the offense, (2) punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) Michigan’s traditional goal of and preference for rehabilitation.”

On the first two factors, the court reasoned that mandatory LWOP is especially severe for younger people who will serve longer time in prison and who retain the “incredible capacity for change[.]” On the third factor, the court compared Michigan’s mandatory sentencing scheme both to other states and other countries. It noted that “only 16 other states now mandate LWOP for equivalent first-degree murder” and that in 2022 the Supreme Court of Canada held that all LWOP sentences, regardless of age, are unconstitutional. On the whole, the court found, the ” national and international trends concerning the punishment of late adolescents convicted of heinous crimes … are trending away from the imposition of mandatory LWOP for late adolescents.”

Finally, the court explained that both the original meaning of “cruel or unusual” in Michigan and the state’s historical practice show a deep constitutional commitment to prioritizing rehabiliation whenever possible. With regard to historical practice, the court emphasized that from 1850 through much of the 20th century, even people technically sentenced to “life without parole” received regular review and a meaningful chance at release through commutation and parole. Given that modern LWOP completely forecloses the ideal of rehabiliation, and that youthful offenders retain a capacity to change, the fourth factor weighed heavily in favor of striking down these sentences.

Justice Richard Bernstein concurred to say that, instead of drawing a bright-line rule at age 21, he “would … follow the consensus of the relevant scientific studies and draw such a line at age 25.”