Workman v. Commonwealth

Ky. Const. § 17 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.”)

Two 14-year-old boys convicted of “forcible rape” challenged their sentences of life without the possibility parole as both “cruel and unusual” punishment under the 8th Amendment, and “cruel” punishment under the Kentucky state constitution.

(NB: later vacated as nonjusticiable) Life without the possibility of parole for rape violates Kentucky’s “cruel” punishment prohibition when applied to juveniles.

This opinion, though later vacated by the Kentucky Supreme Court as nonjusticiable, is an early example of courts protecting youth from extreme punishments, and presaged later U.S. Supreme Court opinions such as Graham v. Florida and United States v. Miller.

The court cited three separate tests found in both state and federal case law to assess cruel and unusual punishments and then essentially analyzed the youth LWOP sentences at issue under a mix of three. Of the three, the third, based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1910 decision in Weems v. United States and 1962 decision in Robinson v. California, is the most interesting, as it looks more like a strict-scrutiny-style analysis:

(1) “The first approach is to determine whether in view of all of the circumstances the punishment in question is of such character as to shock the general conscience and to violate the principles of fundamental fairness. This approach should always be made in light of developing concepts of elemental decency; (2) “the next approach … pits the offense against the punishment and if they are found to be greatly disproportionate, then the punishment becomes cruel and unusual; (3) “the third test is, does the punishment go beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim of the public intent as expressed by the legislative act? If it exceeds any legitimate penal aim, it is cruel and unusual.”

The court’s application of these tests reads, in full: “In examining the petition of the applicants before us, we are of the opinion that life imprisonment without benefit of parole for two fourteen-year-old youths under all the circumstances shocks the general conscience of society today and is intolerable to fundamental fairness. The intent of the legislature in providing a penalty of life imprisonment without benefit of parole for the offense of rape undoubtedly was to deal with dangerous and incorrigible individuals who would be a constant threat to society. We believe that incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth; that it is impossible to make a judgment that a fourteen-year-old youth, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for the rest of his life. Therefore, so much of [the sentencing statute] as permits confinement without parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is in violation of section 17 of the Constitution when applied to a juvenile.”